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#### Our interpretation is negatives should not be burdened with rejoinder against affs that defend something other than the desirability of topical action---winning The United States federal government should not substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States should always be a sufficient condition for voting negative.

#### “Resolved” before colon denotes a formal resolution

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>; GR]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Prohibitions” are laws forbidding actions

Garner ’19 [Bryan A; Editor in Chief of Black’s Law Dictionary; Westlaw, Black's Law Dictionary, Eleventh Edition, “Prohibitions”]

prohibition (15c) 1. A law or order that forbids a certain action; PROSCRIPTION (1).

#### “Anti-trust law” is controlled by the federal government

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote neg for predictability: allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible.

#### The impact is clash- Advocating actions outside the resolution overstretches negative research burdens, which destroys second-level understanding and turns the case

Grossberg 15 **-** Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Debates over the specific details of the implementation of a plan breaks cycles of polarization- debates about value systems in the abstract reinforce it.

Wray Herbert 12 {Wray Herbert is the author of the book On Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind's Hard-Wired Habits. He is an award-winning journalist who has been writing about psychological science for more than 25 years. He’s citing Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado. 9/26/2012. “Extremist Politics: Debating the Nuts and Bolts.” <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/extremist-politics-debating-the-nuts-and-bolts_b_1914307>}//JM

Starting next week and through October, President Barack Obama and Gov. Mitt Romney will face off in a series of four televised debates, designed to clarify the candidates’ positions on the most pressing public policy issues confronting the nation today. In place of the ideals and elegant rhetoric of the campaign trail, the leaders of the two major parties will have an opportunity to describe the nitty-gritty of governing: how they will deal with complex matters like affordable health care, foreign policy in the Middle East, job creation, equitable taxation, and more.

But the unfortunate reality is that Americans won’t get much in the way of detail and explanation. If history is any guide, the debate moderators will not press very hard for nuts and bolts, instead allowing the candidates to evade and attack and talk in unhelpful generalities. They will preach in pre-tested catch phrases to the already converted rather than really explaining the difficult day-to-day realities of decision making in a democracy.

Cynics will say that it doesn’t matter, that voters’ minds are made up anyway. But if national debates aren’t the venue for challenging citizens’ thinking, then what is? Voters need to understand the prosaic details of complex policies. Most have staked out positions on these issues, but they are not often reasoned positions, which take hard intellectual work. Most citizens opt instead for simplistic explanations, assuming wrongly that they comprehend the nuances of issues.

Psychological scientists have a name for this easy, automatic, simplistic thinking: the illusion of explanatory depth. We strongly believe that we understand complex matters, when in fact we are clueless, and these false and extreme beliefs shape our preferences, judgments, and actions — including our votes.

Is it possible to shake such deep-rooted convictions? That’s the question that Philip Fernbach, **a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado’s Leeds School of Business,** wanted to explore. Fernbach and his colleagues wondered if forcing people to explain complex policies in detail — not cheerleading for a position but really considering the mechanics of implementation — might force them to confront their ignorance and thus weaken their extremist stands on issues. They ran a series of lab experiments to test this idea.

They started by recruiting a group of volunteers in their 30s — Democrats, Republicans, and Independents — and asking them to state their positions on a variety of issues, from a national flat tax to a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. They indicated how strongly the felt about each issue and also rated their own understanding of the issues. Then the volunteers were instructed to write elaborate explanations of two issues. If the issue was cap and trade, for example, they would first explain precisely what cap and trade means, how it is implemented, whom it benefits and whom it could hurt, the sources of carbon emissions, and so forth. They were not asked for value judgments about the policy or about the environment or business, but only for a highly detailed description of the mechanics of the policy in action.

Let’s be honest: Most of us never do this. Fernbach’s idea was that such an exercise would force many to realize just how little they really know about cap and trade, and confronted with their own ignorance, they would dampen their own enthusiasm. They would be humbled and as a result take less extreme positions. And that’s just what happened. Trying — and failing — to explain complex policies undermined the extremists’ illusions about being well-informed. They became more moderate in their views as a result.

Being forced to articulate the nuts and bolts of a policy is not the same as trying to sell that policy. In fact, talking about one’s views can often strengthen them. Fernbach believes it’s the slow, cognitive work — the deliberate analysis — that changes people’s judgments, but he wanted to check this in another experiment. This one was very similar to the first, but some volunteers, instead of explaining a policy, merely listed reasons for liking it. Consider universal health care, for example: It’s highly complex and challenging to explain, but much easier to label it “compassionate” or, alternatively, “European” or “socialist.” So some volunteers were assigned to do the hard explaining and others the simplistic labeling.

The results were clear. As described in a forthcoming issue of the journal Psychological Science, those who simply listed reasons for their positions — articulating their values — were less shaken in their views. They continued to think they understood the policies in their complexity, and, notably, they remained extreme in their passion for their positions. In a final version of the study, volunteers who were forced to confront their inadequate knowledge actually gave less money to the cause, suggesting that with their extremism attenuated, they actually acted more moderately.

Americans in 2012 are about as polarized and partisan as they’ve ever been, and such polarization tends to reinforce itself. People are unaware of their own ignorance, and they seek out information that bolsters their views, often without knowing it. They also process new information in biased ways, and they hang out with people like themselves. All of these psychological forces increase political extremism, and no simple measure will change that. But forcing the candidates to provide concrete and elaborate plans might be a start; it gives citizens a starting place. As former presidential hopeful Ross Perot famously stated, “The devil is in the details.”

#### If they make debate unpredictable for one side, they also make it unfair---that must be a voting issue because integrity of the game is a precondition for voting, and we’ve all implicitly agreed fairness is good by abiding by other norms---not voting for fairness elevates judge biases which are worse, but if you don’t think fairness is an impact, automatically vote neg even if they’re winning the debate.

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Economization K

#### Neoliberalism is a discursive politics that relies on the work of the market metaphor. The AFF’s articulation of the social world in economic language re-constitutes all life as market, cementing the neoliberal dream and leading to the economization of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Their description of policy debate as a monopoly and debate as a ‘market economy’ is reason alone to reject the 1AC. They assume human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms, securing capitalism’s hegemony.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

#### The economization of life has given rise to the Econocene---an unsustainable period of ecological collapse sustained by economism as the dominant secular religion. The Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

Richard B. Norgaard 19, Professor Emeritus of Ecological Economics in the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley, “Economism and the Econocene: a coevolutionary Interpretation,” real-world economics review, issue no. 87, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/Norgaard87.pdf

The uniformity across geographies of fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies and the economies of scale of fossil hydrocarbon technologies selected for the corporate industrial order we know today. These direct changes, along with the coevolutionary processes of selection, freed people from coevolving with the complexities of the natural environment. This in turn gave rise to modern economism that pays no heed to nature. With our cosmos being the modern industrial order, economism emerged as the dominant secular religion, an eclectic package of beliefs that explain our place in the economic system, our relation to other people and nature, and how we should live what has been deemed a meaningful life.

Belief in markets spread, indeed was carried around the world, even forcefully so, to counter the rise of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through efforts to “free” trade globally, and through the implementation of the idea of development. By the second half of the 20th century, much of the world was beginning to look like the market world assumed in economic models. In the late 20th century, the globalization of capital began and the interconnections between the patches of Figure 3 began to look more like Figure 6.

People performing specialized tasks are now so interdependent through markets that if people do not believe in markets and their larger purpose, all markets would collapse, as financial markets nearly have periodically, most recently in 2008. If markets collapse most of our population of 7.7 billion people would very quickly starve. Economism is necessary to sustain the economic cosmos in which people live.

Economism, however, has also become the dominant form of reasoning and the source of metaphors and utopias used in public communication. With the shrinkage of other ways of thinking about systems, economistic terminology has even become critical to how conservation biologists explain nature to the public. Nature, like other forms of wealth, can be thought of as capital that pays dividends in the form of ecosystem services. Saving nature has become a process of designing economic incentives for individual actors to invest in nature in order to reap her ecosystem services. In turn, conservation biologists now frame their research around market terminology to back up the ecosystem market programs they have helped facilitate. Biology is becoming economism.

The industrial order sustained by economism is not sustainable itself. We are in the Econocene maintained and coevolving with economism. Any new social organizational system that is sustainable, socially just, and provides meaningful lives will also need its “ism” to keep it going. This raises a key question. How can we have new system of beliefs/values, ways of thinking, and social organization emerge, a new ism, without crashing the current economic system, with economism maintaining it, on which we depend during the transition?

During the 20th century economistic beliefs have supported diverse and coevolving capitalisms as we know them and resulted in spectacular changes. Human population roughly quadrupled from about 1.6 billion people to 6.3 billion people. Global market economic activity during this period increased by nearly a factor of 40, or about 10-fold per capita. This rise of market activity entailed a parallel rise in specialization in work and associated knowledge. We went from a 19th century world in which the vast majority of people on the globe were pretty closely tied to the land and performing a similar mix of comparable agricultural and domestic activities to a 21st century world in which most people are performing specialized tasks using task specific knowledge. People are tied to bureaucratic structures, both public and private, while being globally interconnected by markets.8 This new system has proved extremely effective at producing material goods while also presenting unprecedented social and environmental challenges. It is this transformation into what I will call the Econocene that must be understood in order to find our way out.

While social organization, knowledge, and values were coevolving around fossil hydrocarbons and their technologies, however, the geosphere and biosphere systems were operating on a different time scale, accumulating the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that are now resulting in climate change, sea level rise, and a further quickening of the extinction of species.

The Econocene is a period of rapid transition of the geosphere and collapse of the biosphere. The transition to sustainability, social justice, and meaningful lives will not occur simply through the use of market mechanism to reduce carbon in the atmosphere. The economy has become our cosmos. We awake to stock market reports from financial capitals several time zones to our East, work in command and control hierarchical corporate structures while praising free markets, and are absolutely dependent on others in distant places working for the global economic machine. City lights and polluted air curtain us from the starry heavens, few are even aware of the phase of the moon. Reality is on the screens at our desks and on our cell phones in our hands, we share hearts through social media rather than in person. To face the reality we are in, our consciousness needs to become much more closely aligned with how nature and people function in a rapidly changing interaction. The economism that drives and coevolves with the Econocene must be replaced with a new “ism” that is environmentally sustainable, socially just, and supports meaningful lives.

#### The alternative is to become critically aware of the generative force of metaphor. We can accept the 1AC, but must reject their marketized language.

Michael Augustín 15, postgraduate student of PhD. program at Department of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, “The Market Metaphor As an Issue of Political Language and Practice,” Czech Journal of Political Science, March 2015.

2. Defining Approach

A metaphor is a figure of speech that is often employed in political theory and political practice. It is not peculiar to politics as a social science, though: metaphors may guide our understanding of complex, difficult relationships in any domain. But they may also mislead. Because of this, examining their impact takes on urgency, and this is what we do in the text that follows. The Czech political scientist Petr Drulák speaks of metaphor in politics in terms of discursive structures, i.e., customary rules that impact the discourse itself (Drulák 2009: 59). Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By suggest that metaphor is more than simply a speech act or poetic ornament. Rather than being a purely linguistic phenomenon, it pertains directly to our thoughts and actions: how we think and behave is largely influenced by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–4). An example they cite, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ is a perfect example, and confirms that the way we perceive a particular activity impacts how we perform it.

The use of metaphor is thus in no way neutral. Metaphor has a determining influence over our understanding of particular situations. It frames the subject and decides how we think about a topic area. Individual metaphors organize our thoughts and actions and become a substitute for thought and analysis, but often gain uncritical acceptance and harbour certain perils (Patterson 1998: 221). They function to suppress certain aspects of a situation and emphasize others, thus shaping meaning in a way that justifies particular actions or sanctions particular acts, or simply aids in choosing goals (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 142).

Terrell Carver and Jernej Pikalo confirm that metaphors such as ‘branches of government’ and ‘head of state’ used in describing political situations and processes influence our political perceptions (Carver, Pikalo 2008: 1). Jonathan Charteris-Black develops the argument that in political contexts, metaphor is used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations; metaphors change how we understand and think about politics by influencing our feelings (Charteris-Black 2011: 32) and thereby contribute to myth creation (Charteris-Black 2011: 28). Metaphor is typically used in persuasion and frequently employed in the language of rhetoric and argumentation, such as in political speeches (Charteris-Black 2004: 7). But its use does not end there. It has proven an impressive tool for academic research. But it may happen that the researcher becomes so entranced by the clarity and simplicity of argumentation that metaphor offers that he or she overlooks deeper connections in the phenomenon under study.

Before we examine the central issue in this study, we must first differentiate between the concepts of analogy and metaphor as used in this paper. By ‘analogy’ we shall intend a perceived similarity between two entities. The ‘metaphor’ is a higher-level mapping of these similarities that is used to communicate them in the form of a figure of speech. In the current context, the logic is as follows: if in political discourse we speak of politics as a market, we have created a metaphor based on the similarity of properties. If instead we observe that politics involves a competition for voters just as the market mechanism embodies a competition for customers, or that catallactic (i.e. exchange) patterns obtain in politics as they do in the economic market, we have spelled out a concrete similarity and in so doing have pointed out an analogy. Thus, we are analyzing specific similarities between the marketplace and the political system, which we may term analogies, that are subsumed under the market metaphor.

The metaphor may be imagined simply as a set and the analogies it implies as a subset of that metaphor. In a typical deduction, the premises taken together may be said to form a set. Syllogistic reasoning is applied using this set of two or more propositions asserted or assumed to be true to arrive at a conclusion. We may consider an analogy to be a premise (‘politics is an exchange’, ‘politics is a competition’). The metaphor is then the argument, and is more complex (‘politics functions as an economic market’). Metaphors always implicitly contain a set of analogies that state some A is like B. A set of such analogies therefore creates the metaphor A is B. We know of no other scholar who works with metaphor and analogy in this particular formulation, but we consider the distinction between analogy and metaphor to be justified.

The approach to metaphor and analogy presented here is complementary to that given in Donald Schön’s Generative Metaphor: a Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy. The operation of the economic metaphor in politics shares common ground with Schön’s generative metaphors. His topic is social policy, and he notes that social policy has more to do with how we frame the objective to be achieved than it does with the selection of the optimal means to achieve it (Schön 1993: 138). ‘Such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’, but with various ways of making sense of reality’ (Schön 1993: 149). Inadequate metaphors inevitably give rise to insidiously inadequate solutions, because some are based on an inappropriate or simplistic understanding of the situation.

Generative metaphor is generative in the sense that it generates new perceptions and explanations, and invents reality. So not all metaphors are generative (Schön 1993: 142). But the market metaphor in politics does generate new perceptions and provide new insight into the political process. It is obvious that Schön is aware of the inherent risk that generative metaphors bear, and he calls for critical analysis to uncover their non-analogical connections: ‘The notion of generative metaphor then becomes an interpretive tool for the critical analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically about social policy problems, but that we ought to become critically aware of these generative metaphors, to increase the rigor and precision of our analysis of social policy problems by examining the analogies and ‘disanalogies’ between the familiar descriptions’ (Schön 1993: 138–139)

### 1NC---OFF

Politics K

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power---that makes a litany of crisis likely---legal change is key

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### The alternative endorses grassroots organizing---It endorses the 1AC, but rejects its rejection of the liberatory potential of legal antitrust reform.

Zephyr Teachout 20, associate professor of law at Fordham University, 2014 political candidate for governor of New York receiving 34% of the primary vote, *Break ‘Em Up: Recovering Our Freedom from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money,* 2020, e-book not paginated.

For decades, instead, the left has failed to understand the magnitude of the concentration problem, how it limits freedom in so many areas of life, how it drives inequality and empowers racism. We have focused on petitioning public government to redistribute wealth or provide social services, ignoring the creation of new, private systems of government that run our day-to-day lives. When progressives do fight private power, therefore, we often do so on the terms set by the right, in which one’s role as a consumer is more centrally important than one’s role as a citizen. Our main tool has been naming and shaming with the goal of persuading corporate boardrooms to change behavior, not persuading Congress to act. You’ve heard the phrases: Vote with your feet. Vote with your wallet. You may even have internalized them so completely that you feel guilty when you use Amazon or Uber after protesting their treatment of workers, as if it were hypocritical to demand the destruction of a service you use every day. A wellorganized strategic boycott is a powerful tool, but the degree to which the left has internalized ethical consumerism is frankly dangerous. It means that when a progressive hears about Facebook accepting lies in paid political ads, they think their job is to stop using Facebook, when they should really call their congressmember and demand that she sponsor legislation that would make social media companies liable for paid lies. Because this antipolitical ideology has infiltrated leftist politics, even progressive politicians are rarely asked to address monopoly problems; meanwhile, monopolies are lining the pockets of most Democratic and Republican candidates to make sure they look the other way.

It is a profound project, to reshape our politics and win back our freedom. But we can break these concentrations of power as soon as we set our minds to the task. We already have the tools at our disposal. Using no more than existing statutes, a new president can demand that the FTC and Department of Justice stop mergers, and implement industry-specific anti-monopoly rules across the executive branch. State attorneys general can—and are starting to— investigate big trusts, block mergers, and force divestiture. A new Congress could certainly help to speed the process, by passing laws that overturn decades of bad Supreme Court precedent and return us to the jurisprudence developed prior to 1981, when it was much easier to stop corporate concentration. That same Congress—and statehouses—can pass anti-monopoly laws directly targeting this modern threat.

With a major, grassroots anti-monopoly movement, we can radically reshape our economy and democracy in the service of human needs. We can have affordable drugs. We can have a wide-open seed market that isn’t connected to a fertilizer market. Farmers can reclaim the right to fix their own tractors, and taxi drivers can get a decent wage. We can have an economy where business owners make a profit but aren’t governed by profit maximization. We can have a basic communications infrastructure that doesn’t rely on targeted ads and surveillance. We can even have an economy made up of worker-owned co-ops and unionized corporations, small- and medium-sized businesses, and substantial local ownership, if we so choose. We can have a moral economy. But none of this will happen until we end government by private monopolies.

### 1NC---OFF

Transition DA

#### 1AC Halberstam defends a revolution---that causes transition wars---extinction and turns their impact

Michael BECKLEY 12. Pre-doctoral fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center; PhD, political science, Columbia; presently an Assistant Professor of political science, Tufts. “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” *International Security* 36(3): 41-78. Emory Libraries.

In recent years, scholars’ main message to policymakers has been to prepare for the rise of China and the end of unipolarity. This conclusion is probably wrong, but it is not necessarily bad for Americans to believe it is true. Fear can be harnessed in the service of virtuous policies. Fear of the Soviet Union spurred the construction of the interstate highway system. Perhaps unjustified fears about the decline of the United States and the rise of China can similarly be used in good cause. What could go wrong? ¶ One danger is that declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States benefits immensely from the free flow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power.¶ Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decisionmaking. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous.¶ The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing “window of opportunity” and should take action “while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable.”158 This belief may spur positive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and preventive war.159 As Robert Gilpin and others have shown, “[H]egemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline and the perceived erosion of power.”160 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to prevent.¶ The other potential reaction is retrenchment—the divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow and national manner. Advocates of retrenchment assume, or hope, that the world will sort itself out on its own; that whatever replaces American hegemony, whether it be a return to balance of power politics or a transition to a postpower paradise, will naturally maintain international order and prosperity.¶ Order and prosperity, however, are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.¶ Hegemony, of course, carries its own risks and costs. In particular, America’s global military presence might tempt policymakers to use force when they should choose diplomacy or inaction. If the United States abuses its power, however, it is not because it is too engaged with the world, but because its engagement lacks strategic vision. The solution is better strategy, not retrenchment.¶ The first step toward sound strategy is to recognize that the status quo for the United States is pretty good: it does not face a hegemonic rival, and the trends favor continued U.S. dominance. The overarching goal of American foreign policy should be to preserve this state of affairs. Declinists claim the United States should “adopt a neomercantilist international economic policy” and “disengage from current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe.”161 But the fact that the United States rose relative to China while propping up the world economy and maintaining a hegemonic presence abroad casts doubt on the wisdom of such calls for radical policy change.

### 1NC---OFF

Pawlett K

#### The 1AC succumbs to debate’s false humanitarian impulse to revel in the trauma of others, bringing their bleeding bodies into the room in order to celebrate them in a perverse orgy of feeling, reducing the totality of their lives to the opposition form of misfortune, confining our objects of research into our own consumeristic fantasy: this is debate’s victory.

Pawlett 14. William Pawlett, professor of sociology and cultural studies at the University of Wolverhampton (UK), Baudrillard’s Duality: Manichaeism and The Principle of Evil, Volume 11, Number 1 (January, 2014)

To give examples, it is through the misfortune/happiness binary that violent and tragic events are produced as instances of types of events such as ‘human rights violations’ or ‘crimes against humanity’. Not allowed to be singular events of tragedy, the awarding or conferral of the title ‘crime against humanity’ produces an event to be deplored by the media, not one to be thought about, but one to be consumed quickly. A violent event cannot, under this way of thinking, be worse than a crime against humanity, it cannot, for example be a crime against nature, or against life. Further, for Baudrillard, the current political fashion for apologies, for “the rectification of the past in terms of our humanitarian awareness” (2005a: 150) is an extension of colonial rule and global capitalist hegemony because it declares – Ok, we are sorry, get on with your mourning and then you can join the new economic order that we have defined: “we make imbeciles of the victims themselves, by confining them to their condition of victim, and by the compassion we show them we engage in a kind of false advertising for them (Baudrillard 2005a: 153).

For Baudrillard, the conferring or giving of human rights, a ‘gift’ that cannot easily be refused because of the hegemony of good, is a form of violence, closely related to potlatch. Human rights are conferred as access to ordered, hierarchised exchange, to exchange within a system of power. Yet in their symbolic violence the unilateral giving of rights removes or takes away the power of symbolic exchange, an exchange where power is questioned, not enshrined, and where there is a potential for a kind of commonality or at least a common field of engagement. With the loss of symbolic exchange much is lost – perhaps land, ritual, sacred language, and what is conferred is a system of rights which the powerful do not need and the powerless cannot exercise. This is the violence of the ‘good’, the “Empire” or “axis of good” (Baudrillard 2010: 88 & 111). Further, Baudrillard suggests that the powerless sense or implicitly understand the snares, humiliations and loss of symbolic defences that await them if they try to play by the rules imposed upon them by liberal humanitarian  discourse (Baudrillard 1983). The riposte that ‘It’s all very well for a wealthy, white, male intellectual to say such things’, a charge made against Baudrillard frequently in the 1980s, is only valid if it can be shown that liberal humanitarian and economic interventions have brought wealth and prosperity to the poor, excluded and marginal around the world. Even by strictly economic measures this seems not to be the case (Klein 2007; see also Walters 2012: 101-105).

## Case

### 1NC---AT: Solvency

#### Anti-statism doesn’t mean much if you don’t have a real way to defeat the state

Day 9 (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, ttp://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical\_failure\_of\_aanarchism\_chris\_day\_kasama.pdf)

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future

### 1NC---AT: Antinormativity

#### Anti-normativity undermines any basis for collective political action---that makes breaking down capitalism impossible.

Mari RUTI 17. Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies, University of Toronto. *The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects*. Columbia University Press. 37-9. Modified for ableist language.

In Halberstam's world of queer failure, antinormativity has become a default politico-ethical stance to such an extent that what matters is not the practical viability but rather the sheer extremity (or rhetorical allure) of the arguments made. This is a problem that reaches well beyond Halberstam and that I will return to repeatedly in this book, namely, that the strand of queer theory that advocates various versions of the ethics of opting out often promotes the ideal of antinormativity so indiscriminately that one act of defiance seems just as good as any other, irrespective of the "content," let alone the outcome, of the act in question. I would say that this is, broadly speaking, one of the main shortcomings of contemporary progressive theory, including queer theory. In its eagerness to reach the next radical edge, the most hyperbolic position conceivable to stand on, this theory sometimes misses its aim, as I think Halberstam at points does, and as Edelman perhaps does in aligning queerness with the death drive and as Puar perhaps does in aligning queerness with suicide terrorism.

This is a politics of negativity devoid of any clear political or ethical vision: it wants to destroy what exists without giving us much of a sense of what should exist. It may of course be that offering an alternative politicoethical vision is more or less impossible. Perhaps it is not the task of theory to define the future but merely to critique the present. In principle, I do not have a problem with the idea that the purpose of theory is to show us what is wrong rather than to tell us what to do. At the same time, I am more inclined to look for "real-life" referents for my theoretical paradigms than those who believe that theory is-or should be-an imaginative activity wholly divorced from the exigencies of lived reality. On the one hand, the latter attitude is freeing in the sense that suddenly anything is possible, including the idea that stupidity represents a radical politicoethical project. But on the other, it can lead to what Lacan calls "empty" speech, speech devoid of any meaning (pure rhetoric). It is from this partly unconvinced perspective that I would like to start putting pressure on three interrelated tendencies within recent queer theory. I will return to each of these tendencies in greater detail in later chapters. Here let me merely name them briefly.

First, I do not think that the celebration of negativity for its own sake that characterizes some versions of queer theory amounts to much (besides explosive rhetoric). I prefer to work with negativity, to see what negativity can do for us. In the next two chapters, I will try to illustrate that this is what Lacan sought to do, despite Edelman's efforts to tell us otherwise. Second, I think that the semiautomatic-and therefore no longer honestly critical-attempt to annihilate "the subject" that runs through much of progressive theory, including queer theory, is a theoretical and politicoethical dead end. Though I understand the historical reasons for the assault on the humanist subject, I wonder about the almost ritualistic manner in which the slaughter of "the subject" gets undertaken from text to text, as if thinkers such as Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze somehow botched the job back in the 1960s and 1970s. It seems to me that this all-too predictable battering of the subject represents a theoretical repetition compulsion in the strictly Freudian sense, indicating, among other things, a traumatic fixation that keeps us from moving to new conceptual terrains, including the question of what it might mean to be a subject after the collapse of the unified, arrogant, and self-mastering subject of humanist metaphysics. Of all the recurring themes of queer theory, the assault on the subject is what, for me, gives the strongest impression of empty speech, for it seems to have virtually nothing to do with the personal realities of those who advocate it, most of whom live semicoherent, semicontinous lives in semiconsistent (usually tenured) lifeworlds.

Third, I think that queer theory's antinormativity can all too easily lose track of the continued need for normative justice: the kind of justice that makes judgments about the "right" or "wrong" of things. Though I am well aware of the ways in which traditional normative systems have been used violently to exclude, vilify, and mortify queer subjects, and though I have no wish to argue for "objective" foundations of justice, it seems to me that if we are to posit, say, that the dominance of heteropatriarchy represents a social injustice, then we have to have some normative grounds for making this claim, for pronouncing it "wrong." Antinormativity, in short, always retains an implicit normative content. I would say that queer theory's willful blindness [ignorance] to this fact-the attitude that says that "we" reject all norms as oppressive-represents the kind of theoretical bad faith that leads to various politico-ethical hypocrisies, such as a reliance on the much-maligned "liberals" to uphold the very principles of justice that queer theory likes to subject to a thorough (and again, ritualistic) trashing.

### 1NC---AT: Hapticality

#### Haptics are an engineering project for the next steps of informatic control—the 1AC gets coopted. “Reach out and touch someone” says an old AT&T advertising slogan.

**Bogard 07.** William, Whitman College, Sociology Department, Faculty Member. Studies Sociology, Cultural Studies, and Gender. “The Coils of a Serpent Haptic Space and Control Societies.”

Deleuze places this sentence at the very end of "Postscript on the Societies of Control" in a section contrasting the socio-technical "programs" of control and disciplinary societies.[1] He writes that we have learned a few things about the telos of the disciplines, but much remains to discover about the forces that control societies make us serve. What is clear is that a strategic shift in power relations is underway. This shift can be framed historically and economically as a problem of capitalist governance involving the limits of enclosure as a tool of capitalist accumulation. Disciplinary institutions, like the factory or the school, physically enclose diverse populations and force their unification. The confinement of labor within the factory and factory-city gave Capital much power over the accumulation process in the 18th and 19th centuries. It also encountered the resistance of bodies to concentrated containment and regimentation. In part, what Foucault calls the modern "crisis of the disciplines" reflects a move by Capital to modify disciplinary forms of enclosure, to counter the resistance they provoke and intensify the accumulation process. The disciplines reached their height early in the 20th century. After WWII, information technologies make it possible to release populations more into the open. Rather than pack them into closed spaces, Capital begins a new strategy to disperse them. Network controls, like remote surveillance and electronic passwords, allow it to keep its grip on bodies, in fact, to extend and tighten that grip. The new controls promise to counter the resistance of populations to confinement by instituting a kind of mobile and free form of enclosure. The forces of accumulation, exploiting the capacities of openness and accessibility in networks, begin to follow you on the road and, as we have learned in the last few decades, turn "on the road" into work, home into work, play into work, the whole planet into a flexible, controlled space of work. It is possible that all this means the end of enclosure as a capitalist program and the advent of post-disciplinary, even post-capitalist, society. More likely, as suggested by Deleuze's analysis, is that rigid mechanisms of enclosure are giving way to supple ones that have lost none of their power to constrict the body. The new mechanisms can position and fix the body independently of its location. They expand its territory but more tightly control the information parameters within which it functions. These controls range from the mundane (remote electronic surveillance -- are you where you're supposed to be?) to the extreme (genetic engineering -- you're always there in advance). These are still forms of enclosure, but the walls of the factory give way to the permeating "spirit" of the corporation, the accumulation of things shifts to the accumulation of information, and networked bodies replace the spatial concentration of populations. One of these supple technologies of enclosure is called haptics, from the Greek for the ability to make contact with or to fasten. Unlike information control that requires a confined population (discipline), or a dispersed population under passive surveillance (such as CCTV), haptic technologies respond to the active body and supply it with tactile feedback. The program of haptics is simple: simulate the body's feelings of manipulating objects in the real world (data-gloves that react with vibratory stimuli to users' handling of simulated objects are a classic example of a haptic technology). Haptic control is one of many "coils of a serpent" forming on the horizon of control societies, intensive information networked in ways to manage and counter the body's most basic capacity to resist, its sensitivity to its own power.Because it is tactile control, haptics reminds us that "coils of a serpent" is not a metaphor for Deleuze. Control societies are not coils in name only, but literally. They are not analogues, but isomorphs of each other. They do not resemble each other, nor is one a model for the other. They are different concrete assemblages with different contents, but they are assembled and work in the same ways, specifically as tactile controls. Likewise, disciplinary societies do not resemble burrows of molehills, they are distinct assemblages organized by the same abstract machine, one that can be described as serial or optical control. Coils and burrows are apparatuses of capture; in burrows or coils, either way, you are caught. Burrows, however, are rigid, arborescent structures, assembled as series of confined spaces or interiors. Foucault has shown us how, in disciplinary societies, you move from one interior to the next, from home, to school, to work, back home.[2] These interiors are constructed as closed "optical" spaces and their occupants placed under passive observation. Each interior partitions space and orders time according to its own method -- the factory, the household, the classroom -- but you always move sequentially between them. Serpents' coils, on the other hand, are meshes rather than series.[3] A more flexible form of enclosure than burrows, they adjust to the body as it moves and wherever it moves. Serpent's coils are networks of modulating pressures. They contract and release in waves, substituting for control of the body's optical environment the regulation of its tactile milieu. Because they enclose the body at its surface, effectively reducing the interior to the body itself, coils form a kind of mobile confinement. Surrounding you as you go out the door and into the open, they go where you go, or stay where you stay. With coils, control is more intensive, enclosure more supple, and confinement to fixed interiors redundant. Control societies, Deleuze writes, are organized by codes. Codes are flexible systems of capture in ways that fixed enclosures are not. They can be quickly and easily reconfigured to regulate access to networks. He uses Guattari's example of a passcode that allows you into certain areas of a city at given times of day, but can just as easily be changed to lock you out. Embedded today in technologies like barcoded ID cards, and tomorrow in your genetically modified cells, codes eventually aim to control capitalist accumulation at the haptic or tactile level.In a sense, we could assert that this is still discipline, updated to new conditions of accumulation. In fact, control societies simulate disciplinary societies -- they have all their "feel" without their walls. Not just discipline by means of optical control, but by direct adjustments of the sensitivity of the body, its capacities to affect and be affected. It is hard to imagine control societies without the extensive preparations made for them by disciplinary societies. But, as Deleuze says, the coils of a serpent are more complex than burrows, and if we have learned something of the complexity of the disciplines, we are still struggling to understand and resist societies of control. Everything touches everything.-- Jorge Luis BorgesReach out and touch someone.-- Old AT&T advertising sloganIf the body's optical space was a target of disciplinary societies[4], haptic control is about its tactile space. Unlike vision, which is concentrated in the head, tactility is distributed throughout the body (including the eyes), in sheets of varying intensities. It is not one of the five senses (touch), but a capacity of all of them, a quality of openness or sensitivity. Tactility involves not only so-called extero-perception (perception directed outward to the external environment), but also proprioception, the body's internal sense of itself and its required efforts to move or resist movement.[5] It belongs to the body's complex web of nerves and muscles and joints. Like Taussig said of the nervous system, tactility is that "which passes through us and makes us what we are."[6] It is, quite literally, an affect that opens or closes us to becoming. Haptic technologies are not new -- body armor and clothing control the tactile space between the body and its environment. Today, like everything else, these controls are being informated. In network society, Borges's haptic world in which "everything touches everything" becomes an engineering project to produce digital environments that have exactly the "right feel" and can command the body directly. McLuhan noted years ago that information media are tactile systems.[7] They demand not just the eyes and ears of the viewer, but the intensive involvement of the whole body. The medium is not just the message but the massage, a technology of the flesh.[8] Reach out and squeeze someone. The common view of haptic control is that it simulates the sense of touch, but the larger goal is to create "immersive" environments that synthesize visual, auditory, and olfactory messages with tactile or vibratory information, to create so-called "multi-media" interfaces that produce "complete" sensory experiences. The simulation of touch is simply one step in a project governed by an integrative model of sensitivity rather than a traditional, oppositional model of the senses. In the haptic model, the eye may have tactile as well as optical functions, as a surface of pressure or heat, for instance. It is very difficult, some say impossible, to construct complete and convincing tactile interfaces -- virtual reality systems simulate visual or sound information passably well, but the problems of engineering virtual objects to feel real are of another order of magnitude altogether. Object-images on computer screens can look real, but their texture and weight are hard to capture with existing technology. Incomparably more difficult is reproducing a complete haptic space, which includes the felt movements over time of a subject in relation to his or her manipulation of virtual objects. Research, however, is moving in this direction. Putting the difficulty in terms of the distinction between passive and active touch, inventor Kenneth Salisbury observes: Unlike our other sensory modalities, haptics relies on action to stimulate perception... to sense the shape of a cup we do not take a simple tactile snapshot and go away and think about what we felt. Rather, we grasp and manipulate the object, running our fingers across its shape and surfaces in order to build a mental image of a cup.[9] To get a convincing sense of touch in a virtual world through a haptic interface, the manipulation of the object must occur over time, in a synthetic world still with spatial and sensory continuity, so that tactile memory flows over time to build up a complex dynamic haptic image of the object under examination. To accomplish this, the haptic is collocated in virtual space with the visual, auditory, olfactory, etc., so that interactions confirm each other for the user and produce a realistic, embodied experience.[10] Current haptic interfaces generate vibratory and force feedback to the user, and convey sense information about objects and their surfaces in virtual space. They must be designed to react to users' actions that are themselves prompted by haptic cues in the user's virtual environment, in order to reproduce, for instance, the feeling of grasping and working with real objects. In a word, they are feedback systems -- users react to tactilely induced sensations with further manipulations of virtual objects, in a continuous, controlled loop. A research paper on cognitive computing notes: These sensations can be programmed to communicate information about the occurrence of certain events. Such systems are known as haptic cueing systems. Haptic cueing is analogous to the audio-visual messaging system used in conventional graphical user interfaces where the user's attention is diverted to a certain event or region of the display through audio-visual cues. It presents a simple yet effective messaging approach. .... Results [of experiments with haptic devices] have shown that tactile cueing based systems for conveying spatial features are an effective tool in communicating spatial information to individuals who are blind.[11] Haptic interfaces simulate the feel of objects, their texture, surface resistance, bulk, edges and gaps. Current applications include locomotion devices for navigating virtual worlds (updated treadmills), orthopedic equipment, touch-screen technologies, tele-operators (remotely controlled robots), diagnostic tools for measuring or producing pressure and resistance, density, heat, and other intensive parameters, and, of course, computer games that provide gamers with various kinds of vibrational or positional feedback.[12] Some of the first modern haptic technologies were developed in avionics to simulate the vibrations on aircraft wings, conveyed as information to the pilot's hand on the joystick. These early tools were in many ways the precursors of modern telesurgical instruments, which assist remote doctors to feel, as well as see and hear, the images of distant bodies.[13] Today there are uses of haptics for sex, which would augment visual and aural with tactile forms of erotic stimulation. Pornography, not surprisingly, is a force of innovation in haptic control. If the use of cyber-gloves to simulate the feel of objects in virtual space offers us a glimpse of the future of tactile control, the vibrator does the same in the electronic evolution of sex toys, where convincing tactility is the Holy Grail. There is even an old research and marketing designation for this branch of haptics -- teledildonics.[14] There is a complex relation between haptic control and what Deleuze calls "dividuation," the logic of control societies.[15] Individuation, the logic of disciplinary societies, is external division of a mass into distinct, numbered (or signed) entities. Dividuation, on the other hand, is the internal division of entities into measurable and adjustable parameters, in the way, for instance, a digital sound sample is divided into separate parameters of tone, pitch, or velocity.[16] For audio engineers, these parameters, or "modules," can be independently adjusted (some fixed while others are varied) and modified in real time to flow within certain limits (e.g., if the velocity setting is too high or low, the sound breaks up or becomes inaudible, etc.). Each sound, in turn, can be divided into smaller samples that are also subject to parametric control, and so on. Think of your body composed of samples of vibrational information like these sounds, whose parameters can be measured and used to generate tactile feedback (e.g., the pressure you exert in grasping a virtual object fed back to you as the felt hardness of the object). Haptic controls adjust this information to vary within pre-set thresholds.Deleuze writes that dividuals in control societies are not shaped by molds, which produce distinct individuals, but consist of modulations of coded information. That is, dividuation involves something like a "moving form" of coding (continuous decoding and recoding). A mold, Deleuze writes, is a distinct casting, whereas a modulation is like a "self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point."[17] If individuation produces units that have a distinct casting, dividuation produces the flexible modules of control (the parameters) through which they pass. As an economic process, dividuation serves the demands of postmodern global Capital for flexible modes of production and consumption [18]. When Amazon.com recommends books for customers to buy based on information stored in its database, or when global corporations abandon Taylorist forms of control based on the individuation of confined bodies in favor of outsourcing and informated production strategies, they use the tools of dividuation, i.e., parametric controls, internal adjustments of sampled information, continuous modulation. Capital is a decoding machine.[19] A code is simply the form of repetition of some process (e.g., the translation of words in a language, the conversion of money into goods, the sorting of statuses into ranks, bodies into categories, etc.). Decoding unlocks the economic value of repetitive processes, and it is the basis of capitalist control of accumulation. Baudrillard writes, for example, how the code of fashion in capitalist societies is simply the repetition of the newest model.[20] As soon as one model emerges on the market, it is decoded and replaced by a newer one. Foucault describes prisons as assemblages that decode delinquency, and biopower as a system that decodes life.[21] We are all familiar today with genetic science as a decoding machine linked to global capitalism that promises to accomplish for the body what advertising does for fashion. Here we have one of the best examples of the abandonment of strategies of individuation in favor of continuous modulation. Having broken the molecular code of human individuation, genetic science proceeds to experiment on its parameters. Dividuals are like the newest fashions, the "latest" individuals, recycled hybrid forms with recombinable parts, easily reconfigured, hot items today, obsolete tomorrow. The program of dividuation is flexibility. Dividuals are not the products of fixed training in closed environments, but artifacts of data mining searches and computer profiles. They are the continuously morphing targets of advertising schemes, insurance scams, and opinion polls. A dividual is a data double passed through a moving screen, stripped down to whatever modular information is required for a particular intervention, task or transaction. Increasingly, postmodern subjectivity is defined by interaction with information meshes and the modular dividuals they produce. When you use an ATM machine, you are interacting with your dividuated self, or when you access your work environment via your home computer. Likewise, when a database is mined for information on your buying habits, leisure habits, reading habits, communication habits, etc., you are transformed into a dividual. This brings us back to haptics. Imagine an ATM machine whose interface is not just textual or visual, but simulates the feel of a real transaction with a real bank teller. Or the haptic workplace at home, a haptic road trip, a haptic surgical procedure performed by a haptic doctor. In these examples, the body is connected to data that feeds back feelings, emotions and capacities for judgment to it as so many parametric modulations. Such a body would have as many modular forms as networks to which it potentially can be connected -- simply decode the interface, reconfigure its parameters and save to the file dubbed "New You."

# 2NC

## T

### 2NC---AT: Reforms Fails

#### Reforms succeed---overwhelming data proves progress thesis

Charlesworth ’21 [Tessa and Mahzarin R. Banaji; September; Postdoctoral Experimental Psychologist at Harvard University; Ruben Post Halleck Professor of Psychology at Yale from 1992–2002, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard University; American Psychologist, “Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes II. Long-Term Change and Stability, Regardless of Group Membership,” vol. 76, no. 6]

Data Source

Data were retrieved from volunteer respondents to the Project Implicit demonstration website (https://implicit-harvard-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/), who provided informed consent and selected either the Race, Sexuality, or Age IAT. Data inclusion began January 1, 2007, and ended December 31, 2016; for a total of 10 years of data and 2,553,745 respondents. Only U.S. respondents were included in the analyses, ensuring a sample with shared understanding of the social categories of sexuality, race, and age. Additionally, we only included respondents with complete IAT scores (within the conditions of the revised scoring algorithm for the IAT; Greenwald et al., 2003); complete explicit measures and complete demographics of age, gender, race, political ideology, education, and sexuality (for the Sexuality IAT). Demographics and sample sizes for each Test are provided in Table 1.

Table 1 omitted.

Materials

The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is a computerized Task comparing reaction times to sort stimuli related to groups (e.g., old vs. young people) and attributes (e.g., good vs. bad). Average response latencies to sort the groups and attribute stimuli are compared across two blocks, a societally congruent block (e.g., old/bad are sorted to the same side, and young/good are sorted to the opposite side) and a societally incongruent block (e.g., old/good vs. young/bad). Faster responses are interpreted as stronger associations between the paired concepts. Positive IAT D-scores reflect a pro-Young/anti-Old, pro-White/anti-Black, or pro-Straight/anti-Gay attitude.

Analytic Strategy

Analytic Framework: ARIMA Time Series Models

As argued elsewhere (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019) investigating patterns of long-term change in population-level data is best achieved through autoregressive-integrated-moving-average (ARIMA) time-series models (Cryer & Chan, 2008; Jebb et al., 2015). These models offer several advantages over linear multiple regression approaches including that they can (a) accommodate temporal autocorrelations (i.e., temporal dependencies resulting from measures close in time being more similar than measures far apart in time); (b) address nonlinear patterns and seasonal variation; and (c) offer forecasts about future patterns of change, providing an intuitive index of how much change has occurred in the past as well as the range of change that may occur in the future.

Identifying Parallel or Nonparallel Demographic Trends in Explicit and Implicit Attitude Change

To identify parallel or nonparallel trends in implicit and explicit social group attitudes we perform a two-step analysis. First, in line with a wealth of research on demographic polarization (e.g., focusing on ideological divergence; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008) we begin by examining how the gap between the two demographic subgroups has changed (e.g., has the difference between men and women’s attitudes increased, decreased or remained stable over time?). Second, we also test the individual subgroup trajectories to investigate whether both subgroups reveal trends in the same direction and at the same rate. The conclusions from both steps generally converge (see Supplemental Table S5 in the online supplemental material), indicating robust results. Finally, to further support inference, we perform a supplemental analysis using generalized least squares (GLS) regressions testing the interaction of demographic subgroup-by-time (reported in Supplemental Tables S3 and S4). Even this unique non ARIMA approach reveals convergent evidence with the observed conclusions.

To give further detail on each of the steps: The first step in the analyses is to examine the gap between two subgroups (e.g., male vs. female) over time by subtracting the time series of one subgroup from that of the relevant comparison subgroup (e.g., the time series for women’s attitudes is subtracted from the time series for men’s attitudes). ARIMA models are then fit to the demographic gap time series using the automated forecasting algorithm implemented in the forecast package in the R computing environment (Hyndman & Khandakar, 2008).

The demographic gap time series can reveal one of three patterns: (a) remaining stable (either at neutral or above/below neutral), (b) moving toward neutral (i.e., decreasing gap), or (c) moving away from neutral (i.e., increasing gap). If the gap is stable, this indicates that the two demographic subgroups have parallel trends (Patterns 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 1). If, however, the gap is moving toward or away from neutral this indicates that the subgroups have nonparallel trends (i.e., in different rates or directions; Patterns 5, 6, and 7 in Figure 1). Specifically, if the gap is moving toward neutral (Pattern 7), the subgroups are converging over time (becoming more similar); if the gap is moving away from neutral (Pattern 5 and 6 in Figure 1), the subgroups are diverging over time (becoming more different). Formally, parallel change is indicated by no differencing parameter in the ARIMA models (i.e., p, 0, q), and forecasts that are hovering around neutrality, indicating that the series is already stable. Nonparallel change is indicated by the presence of a differencing parameter in the ARIMA model (indicating a trend), as well as by forecasts that are not hovering around neutrality. The results of all demographic gap series are reported in Table 2 and visualized in the SM (Supplemental Figures S2 and S3 in the online supplemental material).

Figure 1 omitted.

Figure 1. Note. a: Plots represent all possible hypothetical patterns of two demographic subgroups in their implicit attitude change over time. The solid line represents the hypothetical trajectory for one of the demographic subgroups (e.g., White, nonreligious, elderly, etc.), the dashed line represents the trajectory for the relevant comparison demographic subgroup. The list below each plot reports the attitudes and demographic subgroup comparisons that follow the given pattern. b: Plots represent all possible hypothetical patterns of two demographic subgroups in their explicit attitude change over time. Att = attitudes. See caption to Figure 1a.

Table 2 omitted.

Trends in the Gap Between Demographic Subgroups for Implicit and Explicit Age, Race, and Sexuality Attitudes

In the second step of the analyses, ARIMA models are fit to each individual demographic subgroup time series (e.g., just to men’s attitudes and, separately, just to women’s attitudes). Because we are focused on whether the two subgroups reveal the same trends (i.e., change or remain stable at the same rate and in the same direction) we focus on comparisons of the order of the differencing parameter in the ARIMA models and the raw amount of change. Formally, parallel trends are indicated when both subgroups have the same order of differencing parameters and descriptively similar amounts of raw change. Nonparallel trends are indicated when the two subgroups have different orders of differencing parameters and/or descriptively different amounts of raw change. Individual trajectories are visualized in Figures 2–5 and reported in the SM (Supplemental Tables S1 and S2 in the online supplemental material).

Figure 2 omitted.

Figure 2. Note. Thin light-blue or light-purple lines indicates the observed monthly weighted means of the two demographic subgroups as noted in the legend, thick dark-blue or dark-purple lines indicates the decomposed trend lines of the observed monthly data (removing seasonality and noise), dark-blue or dark-purple shaded areas indicate 80% confidence intervals (CIs) and light-blue or light-purple shaded areas indicate 95% CIs of the ARIMA model forecasts, dark-blue or dark-purple lines inside shaded areas indicates the means of the ARIMA model forecast. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Figure 3 omitted.

Figure 3. Note. See figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Figure 4 omitted.

Figure 4. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Figure 5 omitted.

Figure 5. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

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Figure 4 omitted.

Figure 4. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Figure 5 omittted.

Figure 5. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Finally, we also examine U.S. state differences in implicit and explicit attitude change. However, because of the many differences in analytic approaches (e.g., states cannot be summarized in binary comparisons to create demographic “gaps”), geographic analyses are only summarized briefly below but reported in detail in the in the online supplemental material.

Controlling For Demographic Covariates and Sample Changes Over Time

In cross-sectional data, spurious attitude change could arise from demographic changes in the sample over time (e.g., a sample becoming increasingly liberal or female). Furthermore, observed demographic differences across one demographic group (e.g., race) could actually be due to differences along a correlated demographic group (e.g., political orientation). To address both issues of sample change and demographic covariates, we extended the weighting approach used by Charlesworth and Banaji (2019). First, target weights were set for the demographic representation of the whole sample over all time. Second, the sample was split across the demographic subgroups of interest (e.g., into liberals and conservatives) and subsequently split across years, yielding 10 yearly subsamples for each demographic subgroup (e.g., liberals in 2007, 2008, and so on through 2016; as well as conservatives in 2007, 2008, and so on through 2016). Third, the yearly subsamples for each demographic subgroup were weighted to effectively “match” the demographic representations of the full sample over all time, thereby controlling for both demographic covariates and demographic change. For example, the weights ensured that the demographic representations of liberals in 2007 approximated the demographic representations of liberals or conservatives (on age, race, gender, and education) in any other given year. Weighted monthly means were calculated for each subgroup using the anesrake package in R (Pasek, 2016), and the demographic gap time series was calculated by subtracting the two weighted subgroup trajectories. Further details are provided in the online supplemental materials. In addition, to ensure robustness, we repeat all analyses but weighting only to yearly weights (not demographic covariates); all conclusions remain consistent regardless of weighting approach.

Results

Overview

Across all attitude topics (age, race, sexuality) and demographic subgroup comparisons (e.g., male-female, White American-Black American), we examined 32 demographic group comparisons for parallel (Patterns 1–4, Figure 1) or nonparallel trends (Patterns 5–7, Figure 1).

Implicit Attitudes

By far the most frequent pattern for implicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes was parallel trends, with 26/32 comparisons showing demographic subgroups that were changing at similar rates and in similar directions (see summary in Figure 1a and Table 2). That is, most demographic subgroups changed in parallel toward neutrality for implicit race and sexuality attitudes, and most demographic subgroups remained stable in parallel for implicit age attitudes. In contrast, nonparallel trends, whether divergence (four of 32 comparisons) or convergence (two of 32 comparisons), were relatively rare for implicit attitudes. Geographic differences in implicit attitude change also revealed relatively narrow ranges of change as well as significant rank-order stability, implying that most U.S. states were changing or remaining stable in parallel. Theoretically, this suggests that the sources of long-term change in implicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes are likely to be widespread phenomena, cutting across demographics in similar ways.

As summarized in Figure 1a, the exceptions to this conclusion of parallel change were as follows. First, Black versus White Americans (as well as Black vs. Asian Americans) have converged over time on implicit race attitudes, because Black Americans have maintained a weak, stable pro-Black/anti-White implicit attitude, whereas White (and Asian) Americans have moved in the direction of neutrality over time (moving from a strong pro-White/anti-Black implicit attitude to a weaker attitude). Second, younger versus older respondents and liberal versus conservative respondents have diverged over time for both implicit race and sexuality attitudes, with younger or liberal respondents generally changing faster in the direction of neutrality than older or conservative respondents. Younger or liberal subgroups may therefore be uniquely receptive to, or exposed to, the current forces motivating societal change (e.g., Krosnick & Alwin, 1989).

Explicit Attitudes

For explicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes (summarized in Figure 1b and Table 2), the modal pattern was again parallel trends across demographic subgroups (18 of 32 comparisons). However, relative to implicit attitudes, more comparisons revealed nonparallel trends (10 of 32 showed convergence and four of 32 showed divergence). This suggests that these explicit attitudes are relatively more susceptible to the mezzo-level influences of demographic-specific experiences and motivations (e.g., intergroup contact, SDO/SJ). In line with this interpretation, explicit attitudes also showed relatively larger ranges of change across U.S. states.

Together, these findings show that (a) implicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes reveal surprising similarity in trends across most demographic subgroups, with most groups changing in parallel toward neutrality (i.e., decreasing bias) over the past decade; (b) two exceptions were race differences for implicit race attitudes, as well as age and political differences for implicit race and sexuality attitudes; and (c) explicit attitudes also showed a modal pattern of parallel trends toward attitude neutrality, but nevertheless revealed relatively more nonparallel trends than implicit attitudes. Below, we elaborate on the individual demographic comparisons; further details on all analyses are provided throughout the online supplemental materials.

Gender Differences

On all three implicit attitudes, the trends of men and women’s attitudes have moved in parallel, in the same direction and at similar rates over time (Figure 2 and Supplemental Table S1 in the online supplemental material). Thus, the gap between men and women’s implicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes has remained stable over the past decade and is not forecast to converge in the future. In contrast, for explicit attitudes, men and women’s attitudes have converged over time (Figure 2 and Supplemental Table S2). Indeed, the ARIMA forecasts indicate that gender differences on explicit race, age, and sexuality attitudes could converge as early as 2020, 2025, and 2028, respectively. Such convergence is the result of men shifting toward attitude neutrality by greater amounts than women: for race, age, sexuality attitudes, respectively, men’s raw change = .17, .20, .50 points and women’s raw change = .08, .17, .32 points (Supplemental Table S2).

Figure 2 omitted.

Figure 2. Note. Thin light-blue or light-purple lines indicates the observed monthly weighted means of the two demographic subgroups as noted in the legend, thick dark-blue or dark-purple lines indicates the decomposed trend lines of the observed monthly data (removing seasonality and noise), dark-blue or dark-purple shaded areas indicate 80% confidence intervals (CIs) and light-blue or light-purple shaded areas indicate 95% CIs of the ARIMA model forecasts, dark-blue or dark-purple lines inside shaded areas indicates the means of the ARIMA model forecast. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Race Differences: White Versus Asian Americans, White Versus Black Americans, and Asian Versus Black Americans

For all implicit attitudes, White and Asian Americans revealed parallel trends over the past decade (Supplemental Table S1 in the online supplemental material and Table 2). Similarly, for all explicit attitudes, White and Asian Americans had parallel trends over time (Supplemental Table S2 and Table 2). Thus, when it comes to evaluating groups defined by age, sexuality, or Black/White racial groups, White and Asian Americans appear to be shaped by similar macrolevel forces over time.

A different pattern emerges when contrasting the attitudes of Black and White Americans. Although Black and White Americans revealed parallel trends on implicit age and sexuality attitudes (Figure 3; Supplemental Table S1; and Table 2), they have converged over time on implicit race attitudes. This convergence is due to faster change toward neutrality among White Americans (who started at an IAT D-score of .40 and decreased in pro-White/anti-Black attitudes by .06 points) and relative stability among Black Americans, who maintained a weak pro-Black/anti-White implicit attitude (no measurable change around IAT D-scores of −.08 to −.09; Supplemental Table S1). Identical patterns emerged for the comparison of Asian and Black Americans: Asian and Black Americans revealed parallel trends on both implicit age and sexuality attitudes but converging trends on implicit race attitudes because of faster change toward attitude neutrality among Asian Americans and stable, weak pro-Black/anti-White implicit attitudes among Black Americans.

Figure 3 omitted.

Figure 3. Note. See figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Given that White and Asian Americans have moved in the direction of more neutral implicit attitudes (i.e., in the direction of pro-Black/anti-White implicit attitudes), why did Black Americans not also move in the direction of pro-Black/anti-White implicit attitudes, especially given that this would be in the direction of greater ingroup preference? Theoretically, the stable but weak implicit ingroup preferences among Black Americans aligns with previous research suggesting a limit to implicit ingroup preference when such preferences go against the persistent status hierarchy (e.g., Axt et al., 2014; Dunham et al., 2014). In other words, there may be a limit to Black Americans’ implicit ingroup preferences (i.e., implicit pro-Black/anti-White attitudes) because of internalized associations of Black-bad/White-good that are embedded in systemic collective representations.

Similar results were observed for explicit attitudes: White and Black Americans moved in parallel on sexuality attitudes but both explicit age and race attitudes showed demographic convergence between White and Black Americans (as well as between Asian and Black Americans). For explicit race attitudes, the gap is converging rapidly because both White (and Asian) Americans and Black Americans are changing toward neutrality, but from opposite directions. Specifically, White Americans have decreased in their explicit pro-White/anti-Black preference by .18 points, and similarly, Asian Americans have decreased their explicit pro-White/anti-Black preference by .22 points, showing a trend downward. In contrast, Black Americans have decreased in their explicit pro-Black/anti-White preference by .28 points (Supplemental Table S2 in the online supplemental material), showing a trend upward.

Education Differences

For all implicit attitudes, education subgroups (<college education, college education) moved in parallel (Supplemental Table S1 and Table 2). Identical findings emerged for explicit attitudes (Supplemental Table S2). Although such a result may be initially surprising, similar conclusions are obtained in representative samples, where all education subgroups are changing in parallel on beliefs about race and sexuality (see Key Trends in General Social Survey, 2019).

Religion Differences: Nonreligious, Christian, Jewish, Other Religions

For all implicit attitudes, all religious subgroup comparisons indicated parallel trends over the past decade, with gaps between most religions indicating only small baseline differences, and forecasts that hovered around neutrality (Supplemental Table S1). Identical findings emerged for explicit attitudes, with all religious subgroups revealing parallel trends toward neutrality for all attitudes (Supplemental Table S1). This result may seem counterintuitive given previous literature showing how religion shapes social opinions over time (e.g., abortion, Evans, 2002). It is possible that religion may shape change in religion-relevant attitudes/opinions (e.g., abortion) but not so in intergroup attitudes that are not immediately applicable to religious discussions (e.g., race, age). Further, it is possible that the decreasing centrality of religion in U.S. life (Gallup, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2015) may lead to a decreasing role of religious identity in how social attitudes change.

Sexuality Differences

On implicit sexuality attitudes , all sexual orientations, whether straight, lesbian/gay, or bisexual respondents, revealed parallel trends toward more pro-Gay/anti-Straight attitudes (although there were baseline differences in magnitude; Supplemental Table S1). Nevertheless, for explicit sexuality attitudes, although all groups were again moving toward more progay/antistraight attitudes, the trends were nonparallel. Specifically, there was convergence because straight respondents decreased at a faster rate (changing by .36 points) than either lesbian/gay or bisexual respondents (changing by .11 and .12 points, respectively; Supplemental Table S2).

Age Differences

A unique pattern of nonparallel implicit attitude change emerged for age comparisons. First, within implicit attitudes, younger respondents (<20 years old at time of test) and older respondents (>40 years old at time of test) have diverged on implicit sexuality attitudes and, somewhat less consistently, on implicit race attitudes (see Figure 4). This divergence is because younger respondents have changed faster than older respondents. Specifically, younger respondents have decreased by .15 and .06 IAT points on implicit sexuality and race attitudes, respectively, whereas older respondents have decreased by only .07 and .04 IAT points (Supplemental Table S1). Moreover, both implicit race and sexuality attitudes have actually flipped the sign of their age differences over time, with younger respondents initially more biased, but now less biased, than older respondents. In contrast, for implicit age attitudes, younger and older respondents have both shown stable pro-Young/anti-Old preferences over the past decade. Thus, ingroup preference motivations do not appear to activate faster movement toward pro-Old/anti-Young preferences among elderly respondents, perhaps as a result of internalized collective representations that value “youth” (Axt et al., 2014).

Figure 4 omitted.

Figure 4. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

For all explicit attitudes, younger respondents have revealed faster trends toward neutrality than older respondents (see Figure 4): younger respondents have decreased in bias by .17, .18, and .46 points on explicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes, respectively, while older respondents have decreased in bias by only .08, .07, and .24 explicit points (less than half the raw change of younger respondents; Supplemental Table S2). Thus, across the board, age differences on all but one attitude (implicit age attitudes) indicate nonparallel trends across time.

Political Differences

Political groups have revealed nonparallel trends for both implicit race and sexuality attitudes, with an increasing (diverging) gap between the two groups over time. This divergence is due to more rapid change among the initially less-biased liberal respondents (decreasing by .15 and .07 IAT points for sexuality and race attitudes, respectively) and relatively slower change toward attitude neutrality among the more-biased conservative respondents (decreasing by .07 and .04 IAT points; Figure 5 and Supplemental Table S1). It is nevertheless worth noting that, for implicit race and sexuality attitudes, both liberal and conservative respondents show trends in the direction of neutrality, just at different rates.

Figure 5 omitted.

Figure 5. Note. For further details see figure caption to Figure 2. IAT = Implicit Association Test. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

For explicit attitudes, liberals and conservatives reveal nonparallel trends for all three attitudes. For explicit race attitudes, liberals have changed faster (decreased by .17 points) than conservatives (decreased by .11 points), resulting in divergence across time. For explicit age and sexuality attitudes, however, conservatives have changed faster toward neutrality (decreased by .20 and .44 points for age and sexuality attitudes, respectively) than liberals (decreased by .12 and .34 points; Supplemental Table S2 and Figure 5). Thus, on explicit age and sexuality attitudes, the political gap is, perhaps surprisingly, converging over time.

Geographic Differences

All implicit attitudes indicated relatively limited geographic variability in rates of change over time (see individual states listed in Supplemental Tables S10.1–10.8 and interactive visuals at https://outsmartinghumanminds.org/interactive/change-timelapse/index.html). It is particularly notable that, for implicit sexuality attitudes, every single U.S. state has moved toward neutrality over the past decade, reinforcing the surprisingly broad spread of change across people and places. Moreover, U.S. states revealed significant and high rank-order stability for implicit sexuality and race attitudes, suggesting that the states are largely changing in parallel and maintaining their rank-ordering (Supplemental Table S9). Explicit attitudes, in contrast, revealed greater variability in the rate and direction of change across states (Supplemental Table S9).

General Discussion

Across three social group attitude topics (age, race, and sexuality) and a total of 32 demographic group comparisons (e.g., men vs. women, old vs. young, liberal vs. conservative) as well as all U.S. states, we report the first comprehensive record of demographic patterns of implicit and explicit attitude change over a decade (2007–2016). In so doing, we offer insights into the nature of long-term, societal-level change in implicit and explicit social cognition. We show that (a) long-term change in implicit age, race, and sexuality attitudes appears to be widespread, with parallel trends toward attitude neutrality (i.e., decreasing bias) across most demographic groups; (b) exceptions to this pattern are age and politics, where younger and liberal respondents revealed faster trends toward neutrality than older and conservative respondents; and (c) explicit attitudes revealed more nonparallel trends (with demographic groups changing toward neutrality at differing rates across time), although explicit attitudes also revealed a modal pattern of parallel change toward neutrality. In addition, we illustrate a methodological approach for identifying demographic differences within large-scale cross-sectional temporal data, a setting that will become increasingly frequent in this era of big data.

Implicit Attitude Trends Largely Unfold in Parallel Across Groups

For implicit social group attitudes, the majority (26 of 32) of demographic comparisons revealed that the trends of demographic subgroups have changed, or remained stable, in parallel over the past decade. Parallel implicit attitude change occurred even regardless of baseline differences in subgroups’ implicit attitude magnitude (e.g., women consistently had lower implicit attitudes than men, but both men and women consistently changed in parallel). This finding is perhaps surprising, as it stands in contrast to the prediction that differences in attitude magnitude correspond to differences in change (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019; Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Perhaps, the relationship between attitude magnitude and change may not apply when looking at aggregated demographics, although further explorations are necessary.

Overall, the results suggest that, whatever the rate or direction of change/stability, implicit attitude change is occurring at the macrolevel of society. This conclusion aligns with the “bias of crowds” theory (Payne et al., 2017), which proposes that implicit attitudes can be interpreted as products of societal environments. Thus, as societal environments change, so too will implicit attitudes transform across a wide range of demographic groups. Although this model was principally derived to explain implicit attitude magnitude, the current results suggest an important extension to the model: Implicit attitude change is also likely a product of the macrolevel, rather than the mezzo-level of demographic groups. Given this result, future research is poised to identify which macrolevel variables are at play, whether widespread exposure to ecological stressors (e.g., pathogen threat, Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Varnum & Grossmann, 2017b), legislations (e.g., Ofosu et al., 2019); mainstream media (e.g., Ravary et al., 2019); and/or social norms (Jackson et al., 2019).

That implicit attitudes are found to change at the macrolevel is particularly notable in the current social moment of 2020 when massive macrolevel events, including the Covid-19 global pandemic and the large-scale Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, are shaping our daily lives. These macrolevel phenomena have the potential to profoundly reshape attitude trajectories across wide swaths of the population. For instance, increases in pathogen threats from the Covid-19 pandemic may ultimately reverse the trends we observed toward attitude neutrality (since pathogen threats are correlated with trends in social attitudes; Inbar et al., 2016; Varnum & Grossmann, 2017b). On the other hand, the surprisingly widespread approval of BLM across various cross-sections of society (Cohn & Quealy, 2020) points to the possibility that implicit attitudes (and especially race attitudes) may continue to shift toward more neutral and equitable attitudes. Ultimately, only time can tell what impact these macrolevel phenomena will have on the implicit and explicit attitudes of our society. For now, what is clear is this: Although many social attitudes and opinions are found to change slowly or idiosyncratically across society (Rosenfeld, 2017), the current data suggest that social attitudes, and especially implicit social group attitudes, can, under the right conditions, also reveal widespread transformations over the span of just a single decade.

## Case

### 2NC---AT: Rage

#### Rage isn’t effective for changing politics or psychological health

Dr Camila **Bassi 2017** (“On Identity Politics, Ressentiment, and the Evacuation of Human Emancipation” <http://www.academia.edu/25767467/On_Identity_Politics_Ressentiment_and_the_Evacuation_of_Human_Emancipation_Final_Draft_>) mba-alb

Marx (1843) makes plain in On “The Jewish Question” that the route to real freedom lies in social relations not rights alone. Brown’s astute point on the lack of theorizing of class in the multiculturalist mantra resonates especially well in the present-day privilege theory and intersectionality mantra. Is it not time to name and call out once more what is, in reality, the relinquishment of the dream of freedom as humans governing themselves by governing together? Present-day identity politics is based on unchanging status - as privilege theorist Kimmel (2013: xxv) asserts, “[o]ne can no more renounce privilege than one can stop breathing” - rather than a dynamic understanding of human consciousness through human history. Society is viewed as a seesaw: you are up there because I am down here, and you are up there because you weigh me down. It is a personalized dual camp distortion of social relations, ‘me versus you’ (with various intersectional combinations), that breeds resentment and is devoid of class politics. Ultimately, freedom has become dangerously lost in the contradiction of identity politics. As Brown (1995) observes: politicized identities generated out of liberal, disciplinary societies, insofar as they are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal, require that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, for their own continuing existence as identities. (p.65) She develops Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment to explain how the desired impulse of politicized identity to “inscribe in the law and other political registers its historical and present pain” forecloses “an imagined future of power to make itself” (Brown, 1995, p. 66). What one has instead of freedom then is the production of ressentiment: Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). (Brown, 1995, p. 68) We are left with an effort to anaesthetize and to externalize what is unendurable. I turn now to this chapter’s case study: a toxic war between a current of radical feminists and a current of trans activists, both of which with wider layer of sympathizers. This is a war that has played out on social media and across university campuses, and which has impeded connection, circumvented freedom, and bred ressentiment. Privilege production of impasse: the case of the deadlock between radical feminists and trans activists In February 2015, a letter titled “We cannot allow censorship and silencing of individuals” was published in The Observer, signed by several academics and feminist and LGBT activists; it identifies: a worrying pattern of intimidation and silencing of individuals whose views are deemed “transphobic” or “whorephobic.” Most of the people so labelled are feminists or pro-feminist men, some have experience in the sex industry, some are transgender. […] “No platforming” used to be a tactic used against self-proclaimed fascists and Holocaust-deniers. But today it is being used to prevent the expression of feminist arguments critical of the sex industry and of some demands made by trans activists. The feminists who hold these views have never advocated or engaged in violence against any group of people. Yet it is argued that the mere presence of anyone said to hold these views is a threat to a protected minority group’s safety. You do not have to agree with the views that are being silenced to find these tactics illiberal and undemocratic. Universities have a particular responsibility to resist this kind of bullying. As important background to this letter, two high-profile public confrontations are worth noting. The first relates to the radical feminist Julie Bindel. In 2012, the National Union of Students’ LGBTQ Campaign passed a motion of no platform against Bindel for her alleged transphobia. Bindel had made offensive comments in relation to transsexual people in a 2004 piece for The Guardian, which she later apologized for as “misplaced and insensitive” (see Bindel, 2007). The NUS motion included the sentence: “Conference believes that Julie Bindel is vile” (cited in Deacon, 2014). The history of NUS’s no platform policy relates specifically to fascism, and debate on no platform has tended to centre on the question: while fascists (given the direct physical threat they pose) must be no platformed, should one, and indeed can one, no platform racists? In this context, the no platforming of Julie Bindel is extraordinary, as she joined a list that includes Al-Muhajiroun, the British National Party, the English Defence League, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir - fascistic political forces that incite violence. In autumn 2014, Bindel was due to speak at the University of Sheffield Students’ Union on her book Straight Expectations, but a week before she was due, the student management banned her (Deacon, 2014). A year later, in autumn 2015, Bindel was invited by the Free Speech and Secular Society, at the University of Manchester Students’ Union, to partake in a debate titled “From liberation to censorship: does modern feminism have a problem with free speech?” Once again, she was banned by the student management. The students’ union women’s officer stated in defence of the decision that this “is not about shutting down conversations or denying free speech; this is about keeping our students safe” (cited in Palmer, 2015) The second high profile public confrontation was the backlash generated from an article titled “Seeing red” in the New Statesman in 2013, written by the journalist and feminist Suzanne Moore. In the article, Moore (2013) argues against austerity and for those who are hardest hit by austerity - women - to be angry and to resist: It’s not just the double shift of work and domestic duties that women do. There is now a third shift - we must keep ourselves sexually attractive forever. […] The cliché is that female anger is always turned inwards rather than outwards into despair. We are angry with ourselves for not being happier, not being loved properly and not having the ideal body shape - that of a Brazilian transsexual. We are angry that men do not do enough. We are angry at work where we are underpaid and overlooked. This anger can be neatly channelled and outsourced to make someone a fat profit. Are your hormones okay? Do you need a nice bath? A significant reaction followed this publication against Moore’s alleged transphobic reference to “a Brazilian transsexual” (an implicit reference to the model Lea T). This was a vitriolic row between, in the main, radical feminists and trans activists, which was played out on social media and in the press, and included Moore herself temporarily resigning from Twitter, apologising for a “throwaway” comment, and stating “I am not your enemy” (cited in Wynick, 2013). Cultural theory academic Sara Ahmed (2015), in retort to The Observer (2015) letter “We cannot allow censorship and silencing of individuals,” contends in a blog post titled “You are oppressing us!”: **politics is rarely about one good and one bad side, nor about innocence on one side and guilt on the other. But politics is also messy because power is assymetrical**. […] transphobia and anti-trans statements should not be treated as just another viewpoint that we should be free to express at a happy diversity table. **There cannot be a dialogue when some at the table are in effect or intent arguing for the elimination of others at the table.** […] The presentation of trans activists as a lobby and as bullies rather than as minorities who are constantly being called upon to defend their right to exist is a mechanism of power. Sadly this letter is evidence that the mechanism is working. […] Racists present themselves as injured/under attack/a minority fighting against a powerful anti-racist lobby that is “busy” suppressing their voices. We can hear resonance without assuming analogy. Contrary I think to Ahmed here, Brown (1995, p. 27) stresses that while we must recognise that “[s]ocial injury such as that conveyed through derogatory speech becomes that which is ‘unacceptable’ and ‘individually culpable’,” it actually “symptomizes deep political distress in a culture” (my emphasis). One day after the The Observer letter was published, signatory and English classics academic Mary Beard (cited in Lusher, 2015) reported: Last night I went to bed wanting to weep… It was the relentless pummelling of attack on the basis of extraordinary loaded, sometimes quite wrong, readings of the letter. The complaints fall into several categories. 1) I am an appalling transphobe. 2) I am a bit past it, a poor old lady who hasn’t quite got the issues straight, bless her. 3) I have been duped by the transphobes, because I am a nice person really. I was NOT signing up to an attack on the trans community. Another signatory, human rights activist Peter Tatchell (cited in Lusher, 2015) stated: I’ve received about 5,000 messages attacking me. The volume and vitriol of the attack has been almost unprecedented in 48 years of human rights campaigning. I’m shocked. I have supported the transgender freedom struggle for 40 years. But I have been accused of trying to silence trans people and called ‘an advocate for oppressors’. The letter was about freedom of speech, and includes no attack on trans rights. When I signed the letter I didn’t know who else was going to sign it. Now I am being condemned by the McCarthyite tactic of guilt by association. Here we see in action the aforementioned triple feat of ressentiment: the production of an affect (a rage and a righteousness) that overwhelms a hurt, a culprit who is responsible for the hurt, and a site of revenge to displace the hurt; all of which temporarily anaesthetize and externalize the hurt but demolish any potential for political coalition (Brown, 1995). **The radical feminist and trans activist deadlock is the privilege production of impasse, and a symptom of acute political distress in which freedom has been abandoned for ressentimen**t. On the one hand, we have a camp of people insisting that those born into biologically male bodies carry privilege regardless of their identification as women - privilege over women who have an entire lived experience of being women and of its related oppression. On the other hand, we have a camp of people arguing that there are those who are cisgendered (whose gender aligns with their sex at birth) and who carry cis power and privilege - privilege over those who have a lived experience of being transgendered (whose gender doesn’t align with their sex at birth) and of its related oppression. In a neoliberal wave of identity politics, the politicised identification of personal bodily experiences, and the struggle to trump or negate such bodily experiences in a battle over power asymmetry, effectively lets power off the hook. Privilege theory activist Mia McKenzie (2014) prescribes four ways to push back against one’s privilege: one, relinquish power; two, don’t go (she uses as an example woman-only events that exclude trans women); three, shut up; and four, be careful what identities you claim (“consider,” she says, “how your privilege […] gives you access to claim identities even when your lived experience does not support it”). The irony that McKenzie advocates a ‘no turning up’ protest against the radical feminist exclusion of trans women from women-only spaces is that radical feminists are employing their own argument against claiming identities when lived experience does not correspond. Crucially, McKenzie’s prescription encapsulates how a politics that promises to allow a plethora of voices to be heard is in actuality the opposite, a ressentiment-seethed silencing: I speak, you shut up; you cannot know my pain; your experience is incomparable to my suffering. The impasse between radical feminists and trans activists is just this, a silencing, either of trans activists or of radical feminists or of a wider layer of sympathizers on either side, on both sides, or on neither side. Instructively, in an effort to bring peace to the so-called “border wars” between butch lesbians and female-to-male transsexuals, gender and queer theorist Halberstam (1998, p.148) notes that “many subjects, not only transsexual subjects, do not feel at home in their bodies,” and insists on taking into account the wider neoliberal, political economic context: Because body flexibility has become both a commodity (in the case of cosmetic surgeries for example) and a form of commodification, it is not enough in this “age of flexibility” to celebrate gender flexibility as simply another sign of progress and liberation. (Halberstam, 2005, p. 18) Halberstam (2005) remarks: In mainstream gay, lesbian, and trans communities in the United States, battles rage about what group occupies the more transgressive or aggrieved position, and only rarely are such debates framed in terms of larger discussions about capitalism, class, or economics. (p. 20). “[T]ransgressive exceptionalism,” “a by-product of local translations of neoliberalism,” has become “the practice of taking the moral high ground by claiming to be more oppressed and more extraordinary than others” (Halberstam, 2005, pp. 19- 20). Halberstam’s (2005) notion of transgressive exceptionalism chimes with the work of Brown (1994) on wound culture as a contemporary form of Nietzschean ressentiment, in which, as Cadman (2006) puts it, “current forms of ‘identity politics’ become ‘attached’ to destructive modes of their own subjection” (p. 140). The political challenge we are left with is: how do we support the struggle for political emancipation by and for trans activist movements worldwide, while demanding open space to critically understand and debate the construction of gender, and to forge alliances for future human emancipation? Finding our way back to freedom The chasm Marx identifies between human beings as, on the one hand, citizens of a universal political community and, on the other hand, private, alienated, egoistic individuals of a civil society, is reflected in the contradiction of a neoliberal wave of identity politics considered and critiqued in this chapter. Halberstam (2005, p. 20) is correct in seeing the identity politics problematic as, in part, a failure of the academy itself: **The rehearsal of identity-bound debates outside the academy speaks not simply to a lack of sophistication in such debates, but suggests that academics have failed to take their ideas beyond the university and have not made necessary interventions in public intellectual venues**. Brown (1995), going further still, recognizes academic developments in philosophy and in feminist, postcolonial, and cultural theory as foreclosing any kind of socialist project for human emancipation on the basis of the failure of Stalinism, which is crudely subsumed into Marxism in general. Our journey back to the dream of freedom requires us as academics making a case for supplanting a politics of “I am” - which closes down identity, and fixes it within a social and moral hierarchy - with a politics of “I want this for us” (Brown, 1995, p. 75 [my emphasis]). If we fail to help make this happen, we will remain locked in a history that has “weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence, force but no direction,” thus stagnated in a “war without ends or end” (Brown, 1995, p. 71). I end with ten tactics for challenging the academic repression of identity politics: 1. To positively engage in the aspects of intersectionality and privilege theory that strengthen and enrich more traditional forms of class politics, for example, by taking into account and reflecting upon the specific experiences and intersectionalities of oppressions; 2. To challenge the aspects of intersectionality and privilege theory that effectively fix human identity and detach human identity from evolving material conditions of existence. 3. To expose and explore the elephant in the room of intersectionality and privilege theory, i.e., Marxism, in order to critically assess its insight into the relationship between political emancipation and human emancipation. 4. To call upon academics to engage with the politics on their university campuses and in student activist circles. 5. To organize teach-ins and reading groups between academics and their students on political theory and issues. 6. To forge alliances between labour movement struggles and individuals and groups striving for social justice via identity politics. 7. To learn the history of past alliances between labour movement struggles and individuals and groups striving for social justice through identity politics in order to understand the potential of an intersectional class politics. For example, by examining the case of the 1984-1985 Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners group, as documented by the film Pride. 8. To identify and develop collective campaigns on pressing political issues, such as for the full and decent provision of social housing, including the safeguarding of those most vulnerable to abuse by landlords in the private 18 rental sector, transgender and transsexual people. 9. To foster dialogue and debate on the nature of oppressions and exploitation, and the means to resistance and social change. 10. To forge a politics that is attuned to both specificities and their connections to universal struggles for democracy, freedom, and social change.

### 2NC---AT: Rev

#### Even if they win the revolution, capitalism and the state will relapse

**Condit 15** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

The theories of social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are, however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement: There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don't know the shape of what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek's attack on the evil Totality (“capitalism,”5 pp. 41/49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage”6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap”7 (p. 81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The resilience of this social theory identifies it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To appropriate Kenneth Burke's terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar” and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

# 1NR

## k - econ

### 2NC---OV

#### Naturalizing neoliberal social relations has tangible impacts on debaters

Monbiot 16 [George Monbiot is the author of the bestselling books The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order and Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain, as well as the investigative travel books Poisoned Arrows, Amazon Watershed and No Man's Land. His latest book is Feral: Searching for Enchantment on the ­Frontiers of Rewilding (being published in paperback as Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea and Human Life), Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems, Guardian, 4-1-2016, Accessible Online at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot] 7-13-2016

Imagine if the people of the Soviet Union had never heard of communism. The ideology that dominates our lives has, for most of us, no name. Mention it in conversation and you’ll be rewarded with a shrug. Even if your listeners have heard the term before, they will struggle to define it. Neoliberalism: do you know what it is? Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power. It has played a major role in a remarkable variety of crises: the financial meltdown of 2007‑8, the offshoring of wealth and power, of which the Panama Papers offer us merely a glimpse, the slow collapse of public health and education, resurgent child poverty, the epidemic of loneliness, the collapse of ecosystems, the rise of Donald Trump. But we respond to these crises as if they emerge in isolation, apparently unaware that they have all been either catalysed or exacerbated by the same coherent philosophy; a philosophy that has – or had – a name. What greater power can there be than to operate namelessly? Inequality is recast as virtuous. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. So pervasive has neoliberalism become that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology. We appear to accept the proposition that this utopian, millenarian faith describes a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power. Neoliberalism sees competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It maintains that “the market” delivers benefits that could never be achieved by planning. Attempts to limit competition are treated as inimical to liberty. Tax and regulation should be minimised, public services should be privatised. The organisation of labour and collective bargaining by trade unions are portrayed as market distortions that impede the formation of a natural hierarchy of winners and losers. Inequality is recast as virtuous: a reward for utility and a generator of wealth, which trickles down to enrich everyone. Efforts to create a more equal society are both counterproductive and morally corrosive. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. We internalise and reproduce its creeds. The rich persuade themselves that they acquired their wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages – such as education, inheritance and class – that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances. Never mind structural unemployment: if you don’t have a job it’s because you are unenterprising. Never mind the impossible costs of housing: if your credit card is maxed out, you’re feckless and improvident. Never mind that your children no longer have a school playing field: if they get fat, it’s your fault. In a world governed by competition, those who fall behind become defined and self-defined as losers. Neoliberalism has brought out the worst in us Among the results, as Paul Verhaeghe documents in his book What About Me? are epidemics of self-harm, eating disorders, depression, loneliness, performance anxiety and social phobia. Perhaps it’s unsurprising that Britain, in which neoliberal ideology has been most rigorously applied, is the loneliness capital of Europe. We are all neoliberals now.

#### It turns the aff------It drives capitalist infiltration and splinters the affs politics into individualistic disruption that ultimately empower global capital

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

### 2NC---AT: R/C

#### Racism was produced as a means for capitalism to fracture the working class- only elevating class solidarity can solve

Haider 18 (Asad, founding Editor of Viewpoint Magazine, an investigative journal of contemporary politics, PhD candidate in the History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz, and a member of UAW-2865, the Student-Workers Union at the University of California, *Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Trump Age*, Verso, 2018)

This does not mean, however, that a “class reductionist” argument is a viable position. As long as racial solidarity among whites is more powerful than class solidarity across races, both capitalism and whiteness will continue to exist. In the context of American history, the rhetoric of the “white working class” and positivist arguments that class matters more than race reinforce one of the main obstacles to building socialism.

Allen and Ignatiev turned to this question in their further research, inspired by the insights of Du Bois. In the process they presented an exemplary model of a materialist investigation into the ideology of race, one that went from the abstract to the concrete. This work emerged alongside that of Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, David Roediger, and many others as a body of thought devoted to exposing race as a social construct. All of this research, in varying ways, has examined the history of the “white race” in its specificity. The guiding insight that must be drawn from it is that this racial phenomenon is not simply a biological or even cultural attribute of certain “white people”: it was produced by white supremacy in a concrete and objective historical process. As Allen put it on the back cover of his extraordinary vernacular history The Invention of the White Race: “When the first Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619, there were no white people there.”

At the most immediate level, Allen was pointing to the fact that the word white didn’t appear in Virginia colonial law until 1691. Of course, this doesn’t mean that there was no racism before 1691. Allen’s argument was to show that racism was not attached to a concept of the white race. There were ideas of the superiority of European civilization, but this did not correspond to differences in skin color.

The clearest example is that of the Irish, whose racial oppression by the English precedes their racial oppression of Africans by several centuries. Today white nationalists distort this history, attempting to use the racial oppression of the Irish to try to dismiss the history of white supremacy. Yet this example actually demolishes their entire framework. What the example of the Irish illustrates is a form of racial oppression that is not based on skin color and that in fact precedes the very category of whiteness.

Indeed, the early forms of English racial ideology represented the Irish as inferior and subhuman, and this ideology was later repeated word for word to justify both the genocide of Indigenous people in the Americas and the enslavement of Africans. Nor was it only a matter of words: the very practices of settler colonialism, land seizures, and plantation production were established in Ireland. Allen demonstrates this with reference to specific laws:

If under Anglo-American slavery, “the rape of a female slave was not a crime, but a mere trespass on the master’s property,” so, in 1278, two Anglo-Normans, brought into court and charged with raping Margaret O’Rorke were found not guilty because “the said Margaret is an Irishwoman.” If a law enacted in Virginia in 1723, provided that, “manslaughter of a slave is not punishable,” so under Anglo-Norman law it sufficed for acquittal to show that the victim in a slaying was Irish. Anglo-Norman priests granted absolution on the grounds that it was “no more sin to kill an Irishman than a dog or any other brute.”9

So racial oppression arises in the Irish case without skin color as its basis. We are forced to ask how we end up with a racial ideology revolving around skin color that represents African people as subhuman and that considers both Irish and English to be part of a unitary “white race.”

The historical record quite clearly demonstrates that white supremacy and thus the white race are formed within the American transition to capitalism, specifically because of the centrality of racial slavery. However, we have to resist the temptation, imposed on us by racial ideology, to explain slavery through race. Slavery is not always racial. It existed in ancient Greece and Rome and also in Africa, and was not attached specifically to a racial ideology. Slavery is a form of forced labor characterized by the market exchange of the laborer. But there are various forms of forced labor, and its first form in Virginia was indentured labor, in which a laborer is forced to work for a limited period of time to work off a debt, often with some incentive like land ownership after the end of the term. The first Africans to arrive in Virginia 1619 were put to work as indentured servants, within the same legal category as European indentured servants. In fact, until 1660 all African American laborers, like their European American counterparts, were indentured servants who had limited terms of servitude. There was no legal differentiation based on racial ideology: free African Americans owned property, land, and sometimes indentured servants of their own. There were examples of intermarriage between Europeans and Africans. It was only in the late seventeenth century that the labor force of the American colonies shifted decisively to African slaves who did not have limits on their terms of servitude.

As Painter points out in The History of White People, these forms of labor and their transformations are fundamental in understanding how racial ideology comes about:

Work plays a central part in race talk, because the people who do the work are likely to be figured as inherently deserving the toil and poverty of laboring status. It is still assumed, wrongly, that slavery anywhere in the world must rest on a foundation of racial difference. Time and again, the better classes have concluded that those people deserve their lot; it must be something within them that puts them at the bottom. In modern times, we recognize this kind of reasoning as it relates to black race, but in other times the same logic was applied to people who were white, especially when they were impoverished immigrants seeking work.10

“In sum,” Painter writes, “before an eighteenth-century boom in the African slave trade, between one-half and two-thirds of all early white immigrants to the British colonies in the Western Hemisphere came as unfree laborers, some 300,000 to 400,000 people.”11 The definitions of whiteness as freedom and blackness as slavery did not yet exist.

It turns out that defining race involves answering some unexpected historical questions: How did some indentured servants come to be forced into bondage for their entire lives rather than a limited term? How did this category of forced labor come to be represented in terms of race? Why did the colonial ruling class come to rely on racial slavery when various other regimes of labor were available?

The first economic boom of the American colonies was in Virginia tobacco production in the 1620s, and it was based on the labor of primarily European indentured servants. African Americans were only about a fifth of the labor force: most forced labor was initially European, and the colonial planter class relied on this forced labor for its economic growth. But they couldn’t just rely on European indentured labor because it was based on voluntary migration, and the incentive to participate in a life of brutal labor and die early was not sufficient to generate a consistently growing workforce. As Barbara Fields puts it, “Neither white skin nor English nationality protected servants from the grossest forms of brutality and exploitation. The only degradation they were spared was perpetual enslavement along with their issue in perpetuity, the fate that eventually befell the descendants of Africans.”12

African Americans, on the other hand, had been forcibly removed from their homelands. So the ruling class began to alter its laws to be able to deny some laborers an end to their terms of servitude, which they were only able to accomplish in the case of African laborers. What really changed everything was Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. This began as a conflict within the elite planter class, directed toward a brutal attack on the Indigenous population. But it also gave rise to a rebellious mob of European and African laborers, who burned down the capital city of Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The insurrectionary alliance of European and African laborers was a fundamental existential threat to the colonial ruling class, and the possibility of such an alliance among exploited peoples had to be prevented forever.

Here we see a watershed moment in the long and complex process of the invention of the white race as a form of social control. The ruling class shifted its labor force decisively toward African slaves, and thus avoided dealing with the demand of indentured servants for eventual freedom and landownership. It fortified whiteness as a legal category, the basis for denying an end to the term of servitude for African forced labor. By the eighteenth century the Euro-American planter class had entered into a bargain with the Euro-American laboring classes, who were mostly independent subsistence farmers: it exchanged certain social privileges for a cross-class alliance of Euro-Americans to preserve a superexploited African labor force. This Euro-American racial alliance was the best defense of the ruling class against the possibility of a Euro-American and African American working-class alliance. It is at this point, Nell Painter concludes, that we see the “now familiar equation that converts race to black and black to slave.”13

The invention of the white race further accelerated when the Euro-American ruling class encountered a new problem in the eighteenth century. As the colonial ruling class began to demand its independence from the divinely ordained executives and landed wealth of the English nobility, they made claims for the intrinsic equality of all people and the idea of natural rights. As Barbara Fields puts it:

Racial ideology supplied the means of explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights, and, more important, a republic in which those doctrines seemed to represent accurately the world in which all but a minority lived. Only when the denial of liberty became an anomaly apparent even to the least observant and reflective members of Euro-American society did ideology systematically explain the anomaly.14

In other words, the Euro-American ruling class had to advance an ideology of the inferiority of Africans in order to rationalize forced labor, and they had to incorporate European populations into the category of the white race, despite the fact that many of these populations had previously been considered inferior.

This racial ideology developed further as the new American nation encountered the phenomenon of the voluntary migration of free laborers from Europe, many of whom came from populations that were viewed as distinct European races: the Italians, Eastern Europeans, and Jews, but especially the exemplary case of the Irish, whose emigration to the US spiked with the famines of the mid-nineteenth century produced by English colonialism.

The Irish, among the most oppressed and rebellious groups in Europe, were offered the bargain that had protected the American ruling class. Frederick Douglass pointed this out very clearly in 1853, at the anniversary meeting of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in New York:

The Irish, who, at home, readily sympathize with the oppressed everywhere, are instantly taught when they step upon our soil to hate and despise the Negro. They are taught to believe that he eats the bread that belongs to them. The cruel lie is told them, that we deprive them of labor and receive the money which would otherwise make its way into their pockets. Sir, the Irish-American will find out his mistake one day.15

Douglass had gone to Ireland to avoid being returned to slavery and said he was for the first time in his life treated as an ordinary person, exclaiming in a letter to the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, “I breathe, and lo! the chattel becomes a man … I meet nothing to remind me of my complexion.”16 Of course, this was not because of some intrinsic kindness of the Irish. It was rather because, at this stage in history, there were no white people there. This was clear to Douglass because he arrived during the Great Famine. Writing in his memoirs of the songs sung by slaves on the American plantations, he added: “Nowhere outside of dear old Ireland, in the days of want and famine, have I heard sounds so mournful.”17

But what Irish immigrants realized after immigrating to the United States is that they could ameliorate their subjugation by joining the club of the white race, as Ignatiev has recounted.18 They could become members of a “white race” with higher status if they actively supported the continuing enslavement and oppression of African Americans. So the process of becoming white meant that these previous racial categories were abolished and racialized groups like the Irish were progressively incorporated into the white race as a means of fortifying and intensifying the exploitation of black laborers.

It was the great insight of Frederick Douglass to describe this as the Irish-American’s mistake. Douglass clearly emphasized the novelty of the very description of people as white: “The word white is a modern term in the legislation of this country. It was never used in the better days of the Republic, but has sprung up within the period of our national degeneracy.”19 Let us be clear on what the invention of the white race meant. It meant that Euro-American laborers were prevented from joining with African American laborers in rebellion, through the form of social control imposed by the Euro-American ruling class. In exchange for white-skin privilege, the Euro-American workers accepted white identity and became active agents in the brutal oppression of African American laborers. But they also fundamentally degraded their own conditions of existence. As a consequence of this bargain with their exploiters, they allowed the conditions of the Southern white laborer to become the most impoverished in the nation, and they generated conditions that blocked the development of a viable mass workers’ movement.

This is why the struggle against white supremacy has in fact been a struggle for universal emancipation—something that was apparent to African American insurgents. As Barbara Fields points out, these insurgents did not use a notion of race as an explanation for their oppression or their struggles for liberation:

It was not Afro-Americans … who needed a racial explanation; it was not they who invented themselves as a race. Euro-Americans resolved the contradiction between slavery and liberty by defining Afro-Americans as a race; Afro-Americans resolved the contradiction more straightforwardly by calling for the abolition of slavery. From the era of the American, French and Haitian revolutions on, they claimed liberty as theirs by natural right.20

However, this was not always recognized by socialist movements. Early American socialists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sometimes failed to recognize that the division between white and black workers prevented all workers from successfully emancipating themselves. We should not oversimplify this point or use it to discredit the whole history of the labor movement. The early socialist parties were largely composed of immigrants who were often not yet fully incorporated into the white race, and there were very significant black socialists—including, for example, Hubert Harrison, who played an important role in connecting black nationalism to socialism at the beginning of the twentieth century. The majority of the early American socialists were not racists, and in fact openly and vigorously opposed racism.

### 2AC---AT: PIKs bad

#### Second, Framing the K as ‘theft’ cedes to the capitalist assumption of private property, which is exploitative

Weisser 18 – Nathan Weisser, Public Relations and Graphics Designer at Works24, “The Circular Drain of Vagueness that is the Phrase, "Private Property is Theft"”, 3-30, <https://www.minds.com/blog/view/826516303619190784> [grammar edit in brackets]

A lot of people who follow the ideology of Marxism believe that the root of all evil can be boiled down [to] the exploitative nature of private property. Their idea has merit, because we face a problem on Earth: that there is a finite amount of resources, specifically land, and a potentially infinite amount of people to take up those resources. Therefore, by owning a stake in some of those finite resources, you are exercising exploitative practices over that infinite amount of people that need those resources and then must labor to get them from you.

So, a problem as been defined: finite resources, infinite populace.

The problem with Marxism, which I am using as a synonym for both Socialism and Communism, is that they try to solve this problem with bending the very fabric of nature around the fact that the problem exists, and seek to abolish the entire natural relationships of trade, voluntary labor, and currency to atone for the problem, instead of trying to solve the problem within the means of our reality.

Here's the memeable TL;DR of the point I'm trying to make:

"Private Property is Theft" is a paradox. The word "Theft", according to Marriam-Webster means, "the act of stealing; specifically : the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it". So, by merely using the word "theft" in your language, you have to cede to the reality that private (or personal) property is a fundamental right of the individual that is being stolen from.

I debate a lot on r/CapitalismVSocialism, (can't wait to not be on Reddit anymore) and you'll find that Marxists do take this belief to be the very center of their worldview. As a result of their entire worldview being boiled down to a paradox, they are forced into going into extreme vagueries every time they are confronted with an opposing view. It would be funny if it weren't so frustrating, because their vaguries are successful from time to time. Their step-by-step process to making progress goes like this:

1. Identify a problem inherit to reality

2. Staple that problem not on to reality itself, but on to people more successful than they

3. Get the whole world to recognize the problem

4. Say "it's this guy's fault", and watch the public feed.